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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
of the State of Ohio for taxes, the State will then be subordinated to the
federal lien, inasmuch as the state law must yield to the federal law
where the two are in conflict on this subject.'8
MARSHALL I. NURENBRG
SALES
Under the Uniform Sales Act' the buyer has three remedies for breach
of warranty by the seller. He may recoup against the sales price, he may
counterclaim or he may rescind. 2 These remedies are exclusive of each
other.
Two noteworthy decisions of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals
appeared in the period covered by this survey, Schumcher, d.b.a. No-
fecatn Heating and Engineering Co. v Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. and Snap-
Tite, Inc. v. Noll Equzpment Co.4
In the former case the court rested its decision on the failure of
plaintiff's petition to state a cause of action, in that while it alleged that
the defendant warranted a furnace sold by him to plaintiff, and installed
by plaintiff in the home of a third person, it alleged no defect in the
furnace which would constitute a breach of such warranty. Likewise, the
damage was pleaded as being suffered by the home owner and not by the
plaintiff.
Up to this point, the decision rested upon questions of pleading and
is significant -to a lawyer who is faced with the necessity of drawing a
petition which will withstand a defendant's general demurrer. In the
remainder of its opimon (which would appear to be dictum in view of
its ruling for reversal on the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action,
and which would further appear to be unnecessary dictum in view of
the fact that it did not remand for a new trial but rendered final judgment
for defendant) the court discussed the elements of damages in a breach
of warranty.
It held that the selling price of the furnace and the expenses in-
curred by the plaintiff contractor in installing the duct work in the
owner's house were not proper elements of plaintiff's damages, if any,
arising out of the breach. The evidence admitted by the trial court showed
that the duct work had not been installed by defendant seller but by the
plaintiff, so the defendant could not in any way be held responsible for
them; likewise, it was shown that they were still in use at the time of
'sSouthern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce, 165 Ohio St. 201, 135 N.E.2d
382 (1956)
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trial, more Than five years after the discovery of the allegedy defective
part of the furnace.
Likewise, the cost of the furnace was not a proper element of dam-
ages. While special and consequential damages are recoverable on
breach of warranty if properly pleaded and proved,5 the measure of dam-
ages for breach of warranty is, in the absence of special damages, the
difference 'between the value of the goods at the tune of delivery and the
value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty. Nor
was a settlement privately made between owner and the plaintiff, as
purchaser of the furnace from defendant seller, a proper measure of
plaintiffs damages as against such seller.
In the Srap-Tite case the buyer sued -the seller for rescission of the
sale of a lathe, for return of the purchase price and for special damages
incurred because of its allegedly unsatisfactory operation, causing loss in
the operation of plaintiff's plant, and for return of freight paid by
plaintiff.
The lathe was purchased on a written contract which provided that
"if the above described reconditioned machine was not satisfactory
mechanically, the purchaser could return it, freight prepaid, within thirty
days and we will refund the purchase price in full."6 It appears that
the alleged defects became known to the purchaser well within the thirty
days and that it notified the seller thereof. It did not, however, return
it to the seller freight prepaid within that time, apparently because at -the
time machine tools were hard to find and purchaser was trying to make
the machine work properly, rather than to send it back and search the
market for another.
Usually such contracts for sale on approval or for sale with option
require the seller to repurchase and allow the buyer a reasonable time
after the trial period to return -the goods or to exercise his option. This
is, however, only presumptive or inferential, and may be rebutted by the
parties either by express provisions in their contract or by the circum-
stances under which it was executed. The express provision in this con-
tract that -buyer was to return the lathe "freight prepaid, within thirty
days," appears to justify the court's decision that buyer had not exercised
properly his rights under the contract, in failing to return the article as
required, and could not, therefore, rescind.
1OHio REv. CODE c. 1315.
2OHIo REv. CODE § 1315.70.
8133 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio App. 1956)
' 134 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio App. 1956)
5 OHiO REv. CODE § 1315.71.
"Snap-Tite, Inc. v. Noll Equipment Co., 134 N.E.2d 846, 847 (Ohio App. 1956)
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The court likewise held that while the three remedies for breach of
warranty - recoupment, counterclaim and rescission - are all available
to the buyer, they are exclusive of each other. It intimated that while the
terms of the contract did not necessarily limit the buyer to the remedy of
rescission, since he had prayed for that remedy and failed to show his
right to it, he could not in this case have either of the others. '
The Statute of Frauds in Ohio applicable to the sale of goods7 pro-
vides that a contract therefor must be in writing if the value is of $2,-
500.00 or upwards, but makes an exception if the buyer accepts part of
the goods and actually receives them. In Cedarvil!e Lumber Co. v. De-
vzents plaintiff sued defendant on a book account for -building materials
and supplies furnished to defendant. Defendant denied generally the
allegations of plaintiff's petition and denied specially that the statement
of account attached to plaintiff's petition was a correct statement of ac-
count between them.9 He also cross-petitioned, alleging a contract be-
tween them whereby plaintiff for $4,500.00 had agreed to furnish de-
fendant all lumber and materials, except masonry, needed in the con-
struction by defendant of a barn on the premises of one Ross; that de-
fendant had paid plaintiff the full amount, but that plaintiff had failed
to supply defendant all that was promised, to the defendant's damage of
$598.
The trial court, on plaintiff's motion during trial, dismissed defend-
ants cross-petition when it appeared that the contract was oral, and at
the conclusion of all the evidence directed a verdict for plaintiff on his
petition on the book account for $430. The court's reasoning was that
since the contract between the two parties was oral, defendant could not
sue plaintiff for a breach of it, but that since plaintiff was suing upon a
-book account he was not within the terms of the statute.
The Court of Appeals for Greene County properly held that the ac-
ceptance by defendant of part of the goods sold under the contract and
actual receipt of them by him brought the contract within the exceptions
to the statute, permitting him as buyer to sue the seller for breach by
seller.
In Kelling Nut Co. v. Barrow'0 there was involved a question of the
interpretation and application of section 1335.03 of the Revised Code,
which provides in substance that goods and chattels which remain in the
possession of a person to whom a "pretended loan" thereof has been
7OH O REV. CODE § 1315.05.
8 135 N.E.2d 783 (Ohuo App. 1955).
*As the court incidentally pointed out, and as is correct, this was susceptible of
proof under the general denial, and could have been stricken on motion by plaintiff.
1098 Ohio App. 531, 130 N.E.2d 353 (1954)
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